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THE SUPREME COURT GAMBLES ON
THE DEFINITION OF TRADE OR
BUSINESS: COMMISSIONER v.
GROETZINGER
Under sections 162(a)1 and 62(a)(1)2 of the Internal Revenue
Code ("Code"), a taxpayer's adjusted gross income is computed by
deducting from his gross income all ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred while carrying on a trade or business.3 The term
I Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 162(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a) (West Supp. 1987)). Section 162(a) provides that "[tihere
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Id. Classification of an activ-
ity as a trade or business generates significant tax savings to an individual, as the expenses
incurred in engaging in this activity may be fully deductible. See Freed, Factors that Will
Establish that a Taxpayer's Activity Constitutes a Trade or Business, 31 TAX'N FOR AcCT.
90, 90 (1983). Such a deduction is permitted even if the amount of the deduction exceeds
the amount of gross income derived from the trade or business in a given tax year. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1975). However, trade or business expenses must be
directly, not remotely related to the conduct of such an activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(d)
(as amended in 1983). If an activity is not considered a trade or business, the taxpayer's
ability to deduct such expenses is lost or limited. See Freed, supra, at 90. Deductible trade
or business expenses include management expenses, labor, supplies, insurance premiums,
and advertising and selling expenses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1975).
2 26 U.S.C.A. § 62(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Section 62(a)(1) reads in pertinent part:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "adjusted gross income" means, in the case
of an individual, gross income minus the following deductions:
(1) Trade and business deductions.-The deductions allowed by this chapter
.. . which are attributable to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, if
such trade or business does not consist of the performance of services by the tax-
payer as an employee.
Id. Expenses incurred while rendering services as an employee are not considered a trade or
business deduction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(d) (as amended in 1983).
3 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 61(a)(2), 62(a)(1) & 162(a) (West Supp. 1987). A taxpayer's gross
income includes any income or profit derived from his business activities. See id. § 61(a)(2).
The term "income" comprises all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Adjusted gross income is an intermediate computation falling
between gross income and taxable income, see 1987 U.S. Master Tax Guide (CCH) § 1004,
which is computed by reducing an individual's gross income by the "above-the-line" deduc-
tions enumerated in section 61. See 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND
ESTATE TAXATION § 1.13[2] (1957). In contrast, "below-the-line" deductions, are subtracted
from adjusted gross income to arrive at an individual's taxable income. See id. However,
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, certain "below-the-line" or itemized deductions have
been accorded less favorable tax treatment; they are deductible only to the extent that the
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"trade or business" as used in these sections of the Code has not
been defined by Congress or the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS").4 The scope of "trade or business" activities has been de-
termined by an ad hoc examination of the facts of each case.' Con-
aggregate of all the "below-the-line" deductions exceed two percent of the taxpayer's ad-
justed gross income. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 67(a) (West Supp. 1987). Consequently, "above-the-
line" deductions, which may be taken in full, are more valuable tax-wise than "below-the-
line" deductions. See 2 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra, § 1.13[2].
In order to effectuate Congress' intent to tax all gains except those explicitly excluded
from income, courts have liberally construed the meaning of income. See Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. at 430. In contrast, deductions are a matter of legislative grace and have been
narrowly interpreted by the courts. See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934). Since their inception, federal income tax laws have allowed the deduction of ex-
penses attributable to the pursuit of a trade or business. See Note, The Trade or Business
Issue: Can A Gambling Loss Properly Be Considered A Business Loss?, 19 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 907, 907 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Trade or Business Issue]. The congressional
policy underlying this deduction is to ensure parity in the amount of tax paid by different
categories of taxpayers. See S. REP. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), reprinted in 1944
C.B. 858, 877-78 (discussing predecessor section of § 162). By reducing an individual's gross
income by the amount of his trade or business expenses, his gross income becomes compara-
ble for tax rate computations to that of an employee earning a salary. See id. at 878.
' See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941). This term is mentioned in at
least 492 subsections of the Code and in 664 Treasury Regulations. See Boyle, What Is A
Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAW. 737, 737 (1986). However, the term has different connota-
tions and consequences depending on the particular Code section at issue. See id. at 764.
The development of the term "trade or business" can be traced back to 1861 and the
enactment of the first federal income tax law, which levied a tax on "income . . .derived
from any kind of property, or from any profession, trade, employment or vocation." Bolling
& Carper, The Evolving Definition of "Trade or Business". Ditunno and Beyond, 63 TAXES
73, 74 (1985). Treasury Regulations promulgated to clarify the Income Tax Act of 1861 used
the words "trade or business" in tandem. See Messamer, What Constitutes a Trade or Bus-
iness Under Federal Income Tax Laws, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 99, 101 (1954). However, the
words "trade or business" were not used together statutorily until the Revenue Act of 1916
in which section 5(a) authorized the deduction of trade or business expenses when comput-
ing net income. See Bolling & Carper, supra, at 75.
' See Comment, Defining "Trade or Business" Under the Internal Revenue Code: A
Survey of Relevant Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 949, 976 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, De-
fining "Trade or Business"]. To determine whether an activity is a trade or business, the
majority of jurisdictions employ the Higgins test, which examines the facts of a particular
course of conduct to determine if the level of business-related activity undertaken by a tax-
payer is sufficient to qualify as a trade or business. See Comment, Gajewski Gambles on
Taxes in the Second Circuit, 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1135, 1143 (1985) [hereinafter Comment,
Gajewski Gambles on Taxes]. A minority of courts advocate the use of an alternate test
devised by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940), which requires that an individual hold himself out to others as offering or selling
goods or services. See id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also infra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
By using the fact-intensive Higgins test, uncertainty has resulted as to what types of
behavior are necessary or sufficient to confer trade or business status on an activity. See
Comment, Defining "Trade or Business," supra, at 976. Many activities a taxpayer may
engage in are unequivocally a trade or business. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 750. However,
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sequently, courts have reached inconsistent results in their tax
treatment of individuals who gamble as the sole means of their
livelihood.' Several courts have denied trade or business status
to a gambler because he did not hold himself out as offering
goods or services to others.7 Recently, in Commissioner v. Groet-
the nature of some activities implicitly raises questions as to whether such activity is a trade
or business as defined in the Code. See id. Generally, estates and trusts are not considered a
trade or business. See, e.g., United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127, 130 (1941) (expenses in-
curred administering estate are not deductible); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering,
313 U.S. 121, 126 (1941) (deduction of trustee fees as expense of trust disallowed). Courts
differ as to whether services rendered by a taxpayer under an exclusive consulting agree-
ment qualify as a trade or business. Compare Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58, 58 (2d
Cir. 1981) (services rendered by bank executive under exclusive consulting contract consti-
tute trade or business) with Barrett v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 284, 290 (1972) (corporate
executive working under exclusive consulting contract with former employer not engaged in
trade or business). Some courts refuse to premise qualification as a trade or business on an
arbitrary distinction of whether an individual worked for one employer or more than one
employer. See, e.g., Grosswald, 653 F.2d at 61 ("It makes little sense to distinguish between
a person who 'holds himself out' to only one employer. . . and a person who 'holds himself
out' to more than one employer.").
6 Compare Wells v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1200 (1984) (gambler is engaged
in trade or business) and Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983) (same) with Noto v.
United States, 770 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985) (gambler is not engaged in trade or business)
and Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
818 (1984). Prior to the Ditunno decision in 1983, the Tax Court uniformly had held that an
individual who gambled on a consistent and regular basis for his own account was not en-
gaged in a trade or business. See, e.g., Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1 (1975). Adopting
Justice Frankfurter's goods or services test, the Tax Court consistently had concluded that
placing wagers or laying down bets did not constitute an act of offering goods or services to
others. See id. at 6. The court had analogized the gambling activities at issue in Gentile to
cases involving the management and investment of one's own financial resources, a passive
activity which courts routinely held did not qualify as a trade or business. Id.
The Tax Court reversed its position in Ditunno, and held that a gambler need not offer
goods and services to others to be within the definition of trade or business under section
62(a)(1). Ditunno, 80 T.C. at 371. In Ditunno, the taxpayer regularly gambled on horse
racing six days a week throughout the year. Id. at 363-64. Although the taxpayer used his
own money to gamble, the court found gambling distinguishable because the daily wagering,
the studying of racing forms and the risk-taking inherent in betting constituted a greater
degree of activity than the passive investment of one's money. Id. at 371-72. Presently, the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits follow the Tax Court's position. See Groetzinger v. Commis-
sioner, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987); Nipper v. Commissioner,
746 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984).
7 See Note, The Business of Betting: Proposals for Reforming the Taxation of Busi-
ness Gamblers, 38 TAX LAw. 759, 761 (1985). The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits require
that an individual hold himself out as offering goods or services to others in order to qualify
as a trade or business. See, e.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir.
1984) (full time gambler was not in trade or business as he did not offer services to others),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983)
(daily jai-alai betting not trade or business under du Pont test), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066
(1985); Noto v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.J. 1984) (full-time horse racing gam-
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zinger,s the Supreme Court held that an individual who earns his
living by gambling is engaged in a trade or business if he wagers
with regularity, consistency and an intent to make a profit, thus
refuting the contention that the offering of goods or services to
others is necessary to qualify as a trade or business."
In Groetzinger, the taxpayer devoted approximately 60 to 80
hours per week in 1978 to pari-mutuel wagering at greyhound race-
tracks and won $70,000 on bets of $72,032.10 However, Groetzinger
reported only the $6,498 he received from nongambling sources as
his gross income for the year, did not deduct his gambling losses,
and calculated his tax liability accordingly."
After an audit, the Commissioner determined that Groetz-
inger's gross income included his $70,000 in winnings 12 and that his
gambling losses, pursuant to section 165(d) of the Code, could be
deducted as an itemized deduction to the extent of his winnings.'3
The Commissioner further concluded that Groetzinger was subject
to the alternative minimum tax provisions of section 56(a) of the
Code and that portions of his gambling losses were thereby taxable
as an item of tax preference. 14 Consequently, Groetzinger was as-
bler not engaged in trade or business under goods or services test), afl'd, 770 F.2d 1073 (3d
Cir. 1985). Courts adopting this position view gamblers in the same light as investors and
assert that "involvement in any profitable activity using only personal funds for one's pri-
vate benefit, without offering the services to others, does not constitute participation in a
trade or business." Cull, 746 F.2d at 1151.
8 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).
' Id. at 987-88.
1 Id. at 982. After being fired from his job early in 1978, Groetzinger gambled at the
track six days a week for forty-eight weeks and extensively studied racing forms and pro-
grams. Id. The Court found that he gambled solely for his own account, did not place bets
for others or run a bookmaking operation. Id.
'1 Id. Groetzinger filed a Supplemental Income Schedule in which he reported his
$2,032 net gambling loss but did not claim this amount as an above-the-line or below-the-
line deduction. Id. at 982 n.3.
12 Id. at 982. Under the Code, gambling winnings are considered gross income which
must be reported. See McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 913 (1961).
13 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982. Section 165(d) of the Code authorizes the deduction of
gambling losses to the extent of gambling winnings. 26 U.S.C.A. § 165(d) (West Supp. 1987).
This limitation on the deductibility of gambling losses applies to both legal and illegal gam-
bling. See S. REP. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in FEDERAL REVENUE BILL OF
1934 (discussing predecessor § 23(g)). Prior to the adoption of section 23(g) (the predecessor
to section 165(d)) in 1934, losses from legalized gambling were fully deductible, thus result-
ing in widespread failure by taxpayers to report their corresponding gambling winnings. See
id. By enacting section 23(g), Congress devised a method by which it hoped taxpayers would
be forced to report their gambling earnings. See id.
11 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982. The IRS had determined that Groetzinger's gambling
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sessed a total deficiency of $2,522, of which $2,142 was directly at-
tributable to the taxpayer's gambling activities. 15
The United States Tax Court determined that Groetzinger's
endeavors were a trade or business within the meaning of section
62(a)(1) as his activities were "sufficiently regular, frequent, active
and substantial.' 6 The classification of Groetzinger's activities as
a trade or business resulted in the removal of his gambling losses
from the alternative minimum tax computation and a reversal of
the IRS deficiency.'" On appeal, the Seventh Circuit of the United
loss was an itemized deduction, which for purposes of the alternative minimum tax in effect
in 1978, constituted an item of tax preference. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 793,
795 (1984), afi'd, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985), afi'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, Congress had enacted "a minimum
tax on specified tax preference income received by individuals. . . in order to make sure
that all taxpayers are required to pay significant amounts of tax on their economic income."
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION - GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1970), reprinted in B. BITTKER & L.
STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 338 (4th ed. 1972). Prior to adoption of
the alternative minimum tax, there was no limitation as to the amount of income a taxpayer
could exclude from his taxable income. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS 1966-1970 1310, 1366. Consequently, the tax burden
was unfairly allocated among taxpayers; through the strategic use of tax preferences, high-
income individuals were taxed at an effective lower rate than modest-income taxpayers. See
id. at 1366-67. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 provided a "'limit on tax preferences' to assure
that those individuals who are financially able to pay tax will include in taxable income at
least one-half of their economic income." Id. at 1366. If an individual did not pay a prede-
termined percentage of his income in taxes, he was required to recompute his tax liability by
adding back into adjusted gross income certain items of tax preference previously excluded.
See J. STANLEY & R. KILCULLEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW 3-26 (1983).
By classifying gambling losses as a tax preference item, the alternate minimum tax ef-
fectively taxed Groetzinger on his gambling losses. See Groetzinger, 80 T.C. at 795. Because
trade or business expenses are above-the-line deductions, they are not considered tax pref-
erence items and are not affected by the alternative minimum tax provisions. See id. Thus,
classification as a trade or business has a significant impact on the amount of alternative
minimium tax liability to which Groetzinger may have been subjected. The Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, tit. II, § 201(a), 96 Stat.
324, 411, amended the provisions of the alternative minimum tax and explicitly excluded
the gambling loss deductions of section 165(d) from consideration as an item of tax prefer-
ence, see id., thus, making it highly unlikely that the unique tax situation in Groetzinger
will be repeated.
5 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 982.
'6 Groetzinger, 82 T.C. at 795, 803. Noting its inability to derive a precise test or defini-
tion for trade or business from existing case law, the court adhered to its prior position in
Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983), and reasoned that qualification as a trade or
business inherently is a question of fact. Groetzinger, 82 T.C. at 803. In addition, the court
declined to require that a taxpayer must offer goods or services to others in order to qualify
as a trade or business. See id. at 803.
" See id. at 795. Trade or business expenses were deductions in the computation of
adjusted gross income; they were not considered an item of tax preference under the alter-
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States Court of Appeals, unanimously affirmed the holding of the
Tax Court. 8 Noting a conflict among the circuits on this issue, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and thereafter affirmed the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision."9
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that prior em-
phasis on the facts and circumstances test of Higgins v. Commis-
sioner provided no "readily helpful standard" to determine the
existence of a trade or business under sections 62(a)(1) and 162(a)
of the Code.2' Based on its interpretation of Higgins and its prog-
eny, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the facts and circum-
stances test and concluded that continuous and regular involve-
ment by a taxpayer in an activity, coupled with an intent to make
a profit from the pursuit of this endeavor, was sufficient to qualify
an activity as a trade or business.22 Noting that some courts re-
quired that a taxpayer hold himself out as offering goods or ser-
vices to others in order to confer trade or business status on his
activities,23 the Groetzinger Court declined to make this factor an
absolute prerequisite to qualifying as a trade or business. 24 Justice
Blackmun concluded that Groetzinger's activities qualified as a
nate minimum tax, as effective in 1978. See id.
" See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269 (1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987).
Chief Judge Cummings argued that "the inquiry should concentrate on whether certain ac-
tivities of a taxpayer can fairly be characterized as a livelihood, occupation or means of
earning a living" and should examine the "continuity, repetition and extensiveness of activi-
ties and . . . the good faith intent of the taxpayer to make a profit or produce income." Id.
at 274. The court noted that trade or business activities are not limited to commercial and
industrial activities, and include the arts, professions, athletics and the holding of public
office. Id. However, a personal activity, even if extensive or profitable, cannot be considered
a trade or business. See id.
Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 983, 988.
20 312 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1941).
21 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 986. The Court acknowledged that Higgins and its progeny
provided only holdings based on factual inquiries into the status of individual activities, not
analysis or reasoning that might be followed by courts to determine whether a trade or
business exists. Id. at 984, 986.
22 Id. at 986-87. Justice Blackmun declined to overrule or limit the Court's holding in
Higgins. See id. at 988. The Court also noted that "[a] sporadic activity, a hobby or an
amusement diversion" would not qualify under this standard. Id. at 987.
23 Id. at 987. The Second Circuit considers the holding out of one's self to society for
the purpose of supplying goods or services for a fee to be a "universal characteristic of a
businessman or trader in a free enterprise society." Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d
1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1985). In examining cases adopting
this test, the Groetzinger Court concluded that these cases had created in gamblers a special
class of taxpayers with special rules that had no basis in fact under the Code. See Groetz-
inger, 107 S. Ct. at 987 n.14.
2 See id. at 987.
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trade or business under sections 162(a) and 62(a)(1) because he
wagered in good faith on a regular and consistent basis with an
intent to earn his livelihood by gambling.25
In his dissent, Justice White argued that Congress' intent
under section 162(a) was not to confer trade or business status on
gamblers.26 While the dissent acknowledged the harsh effect of the
alternative minimum tax in Groetzinger, it reasoned that the 1982
amendments to the alternative minimum tax provisions corrected
this inequity by removing gambling losses from the alternative
minimum tax base. Justice White further asserted that the
Court's holding should be limited to cases arising under the provi-
sions of the Code in effect in 1978.28
The Supreme Court, through its holding in Groetzinger, has
reasserted the validity of a fact intensive evaluation of the extent
and nature of an individual's activities in determining the exis-
tence of a trade or business under section 162(a).29 While the
Court reached an equitable result in holding that Groetzinger's
gambling merited trade or business status, it is submitted that the
Court's abbreviated analysis of the components of the Higgins test
provides little guidance for lower courts when determining whether
a disputed activity is a trade or business. This Comment will con-
sider the factors relied upon by the Court in construing the appli-
cability of the trade or business standard to questioned courses of
conduct and will suggest that an examination of alternate provi-
sions of the Code will clarify the facts and circumstances test of
Higgins advocated by the Groetzinger Court.
EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF TRADE OR BUSINESS
The failure of Congress and the IRS to promulgate a working
definition of trade or business3" historically has led to an ad hoc
25 See id. at 989.
26 See id. at 988 (White, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 989 n.4 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that Congress implic-
itly accepted the fact that gambling was not a trade or business when it amended the alter-
native minimum tax in 1982. See id. at 988-89 (White, J. dissenting). However, legislative
history is silent as to Congress' rationale in excluding gambling losses from the alternative
minimum tax. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 781, 875-884 (no mention of § 165(d) in discussion of changes in
alternative minimum tax).
28 See Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 989.
22 See id. at 988.
20 See Boiling & Carper, supra note 4, at 73. The failure of Congress and the Treasury
1987]
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judicial determination of the tax status of an individual's activi-
ties."' In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,3 2 the Supreme Court broadly
construed "business" to encompass a wide spectrum of activities
subject to a corporation tax under the Tariff Act of 1909.3s The
Court held that any activity "which occupies the time, attention
and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit" is a
business.3 4 Subsequently, in Higgins v. Commissioner,35 the Court
narrowed the scope of activities within the ambit of this statutory
term when it considered the deductibility of trade or business ex-
penses under the precursor of section 162(a).36 Although asserting
that qualification as a trade or business requires "an examination
of the facts in each case, 3 7 the Higgins Court failed to provide any
concrete standard by which its decision could be applied. As a re-
sult, courts have inconsistently applied the facts and circumstances
test.38 In analyzing the components of this test, several jurisdic-
tions had adopted the position advocated by Justice Frankfurter39
Regulations to uniformly define trade or business in the Code can be attributed to the fact
that this term is intended to have different meanings depending on the particular provision
in which it is used. See id.
" See, e.g., id. at 73 (meaning of term developed by courts on case by case basis);
Boyle, supra note 4, at 738 (no definitive judicial definition has evolved); Note, The Trade
or Business Issue, supra note 3, at 907-08 (judicial interpretation of term is less than
definitive).
32 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
3' See id. at 171. In Flint, the Court concluded that holding and managing real estate
was within the statutory meaning of "business" in the Corporate Tax Act. See id. Flint,
which was decided two years before the sixteenth amendment provided authorization for a
federal income tax, upheld the constitutionality of the Corporate Tax Act as an excise tax
on corporations. See id.
1, Id. at 171 (citation omitted). The Court stated that "'[business' is a very compre-
hensive term and embraces everything about which a person can be employed." Id. (citation
omitted).
35 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
" See Bolling & Carper, supra note 4, at 75. In Higgins, the taxpayer deducted ex-
penses incurred while managing and overseeing his extensive investments in real estate,
bonds and stocks. See Higgins, 312 U.S. at 213. The taxpayer devoted a substantial amount
of time to this activity and hired a staff to assist him. See id. The Court held that personal
investment activity could not constitute a trade or business and disallowed the deduction.
See id. at 218.
17 Id. at 217. In formulating this approach, the Court considered and rejected the Flint
definition. See id.
" See supra note 5.
See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In
Deputy v. du Pont, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company desired to sell a portion of its
stock to its executives for business reasons, but legal problems prevented the company from
selling the stock directly to its executives. See id. at 490. The taxpayer, as beneficial owner
of sixteen percent of du Pont stock, undertook the sale of stock to the executives but did
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and required that in order to be classified as a trade or business,
an individual must hold himself out as providing goods or services
to others.40
Individuals who earn their livelihood through legalized gam-
bling are not engaged in a trade or business under Justice Frank-
furter's analysis because placing a wager for one's own account
cannot be equated with the offering of goods or services to others.41
not have the required number of shares readily available. See id. at 490-91. The taxpayer
"borrowed" shares from other stockholders to compensate for the deficiency and was obli-
gated to pay the lending shareholders the cash equivalent of the dividends declared on the
shares during the course of the loan. See id. at 492. The taxpayer deducted the cash
equivalent of the dividends as a trade or business expense. See id. Assuming that the tax-
payer's activity was a trade or business, the Court disallowed this deduction because such
expenses were not ordinary and necessary to the pursuit of his business. See id. at 493, 497.
Asserting that the activities in question constituted personal investments, Justice
Frankfurter, in his oft-quoted concurring opinion, argued that the taxpayer was not engaged
in trade or business. See id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated:
To avail of the deductions allowed by § 23(a) [currently § 162(a)], it is not enough
to incur expenses in the active concern over one's own financial interest. "...
carrying on any trade or business," within the contemplation of § 23(a), involves
holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. This
the taxpayer did not do. Expenses for transactions not connected with trade or
business, such as an expense for handling personal investments, are not
deductible.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40 See, e.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148, 1152 (6th Cir. 1984) (gam-
bler does not hold himself out as provider of goods or services), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007
(1985); Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1981) (retired employee acting as
consultant for former employer meets goods or services test); McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d
174, 178 (3d Cir.) (fiduciary is not in trade or business as he does not hold himself out as
provider of services), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). See generally Note, The Business of
Betting: Proposals for Removing the Taxation of Business Gamblers, 38 TAX LAW. 759, 764-
69 (1985) (discussing judicial acceptance of Justice Frankfurter's test).
"' See supra note 6. See also Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir.
1983) (at minimum, gambler must meet goods or services test), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066
(1985). Strict adherence to the goods or services test would require gamblers such as Groetz-
inger, who wagered solely for his own account, to establish bookmaking operations or solicit
wagers from others so as to properly hold themselves out as offering goods or services. See
Comment, Gajewski Gambles on Taxes, supra note 5, at 1160-61 n.150. Such promotion of
arguably illegal gambling operations for tax-saving purposes contravenes the public policy
underlying federal and state anti-gambling statutes, see id. at 1161, and may possibly ex-
pose an individual to criminal or civil liability or both. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225 (McKinney 1985). Federal law provides that "[w]hoever conducts,
finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business
shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18
U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1982). In New York State, an individual who knowingly "engages in con-
duct which materially aids any form of gambling activity. . . . includ[ing] but. . . not lim-
ited to . . . the solicitation or inducement of persons to participate therein," N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 225.00(4) (McKinney 1985), is guilty of a Class E felony, see id. § 225.10, and may be
subject to a prison sentence of not more than four years or a fine of $5,000, or both. See id.
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In contrast, judicial and administrative precedent confers trade or
business status on a "stock trader" who gambles in the stock mar-
ket solely for personal benefit despite the fact that he does not
hold himself out as offering goods or services to others.42 Using the
factual analysis advocated in Higgins, courts have examined the
nature and frequency of the taxpayer's trading activities in the
stock market as well as his investment goals when considering
whether an individual is a "stock trader. ' 43 Refusing to differenti-
ate between the tax treatment to be given "stock traders" and
gamblers, the Groetzinger Court determined that satisfying Justice
§ 80.00 (McKinney 1987).
42 See, e.g., Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 134, 139 (1935) (speculating on stock
market may constitute trade or business). Courts, in considering the existence of a trade or
business, distinguish between a stock trader and an individual who merely invests in the
stock market. See, e.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (mere
investor not entitled to business deduction); Purvis v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334
(9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (same). A "stock trader" has been characterized as an individ-
ual who has "bought and sold with reasonable frequency in an endeavor to catch the swings
in the daily market movements and profit thereby on a short-term basis." Chaing Hsiao
Liang v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1040, 1043 (1955). A stock investor is one who purchases
and holds securities for an extended period of time to receive the benefit of capital apprecia-
tion of the stock and income from dividends and interest paid out on the stock. See Moller,
721 F.2d at 813.
Investment is considered a personal activity, not a trade or business, because all taxpay-
ers in addition to their occupation or livelihood engage in investing in some form and to
some degree. See Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1985), afl'd, 107
S. Ct. 980 (1987). As Chief Judge Cummings noted in Groetzinger.
[P]ersonal investment to preserve or protect the fruits of one's labor is not the
investor's livelihood or occupation, but rather an activity dealing with the surplus
wealth arising out of one's occupation. . . .The fact that one person has accumu-
lated more wealth than another, by means of toil or simply good fortune ...
would not justify allowing the wealthier taxpayer the benefit of trade or business
treatment of the larger-scale investment activity.
Id. See also Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941) (extensive investment in real
estate, stocks and bonds not a trade or business); Moller, 721 F.2d at 811 (management of
own portfolio not trade or business).
"' See Weiss, Tax Results of Investment Expenses Depend on Whether Taxpayer is a
Trader or Investor, 20 TAX'N FOR AccT. 42, 42, 44 (1978). The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged cases which hold that "a taxpayer who, for the purpose of making a livelihood, de-
votes a major portion of his time to speculating on the stock exchange may treat losses thus
incurred as having been sustained in the course of a trade or business." Synder, 295 U.S. at
139. Investment activities of a speculative nature which involve high volume trading and
short term holding will satisfy the frequency and level of activity required of a stock trader.
See Weiss, supra, at 42, 44. In Levin v. United States, a taxpayer devoted his entire busi-
ness day to stock market activities, made investment decisions based on his personal inves-
tigations and derived the majority of his income from his trading activities. See Levin v.
United States, 597 F.2d 760, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The court found the taxpayer to be engaged
in a trade or business based on the continuity of his investment activity, his direct manage-
ment of his portfolio and the extensive quantity of his transactions. See id.
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Frankfurter's goods or services test was not an absolute require-
ment for designation as a trade or business." It is submitted that
by abrogating the goods or services test, the Groetzinger Court cor-
rectly eliminated an artificial distinction that had inequitably pre-
cluded an individual's chosen occupation from receiving the full
tax benefits available under the Code.
APPLICATION OF THE Higgins TEST
Analyzing the Higgins test, the Groetzinger Court delineated
two requirements for imposing trade or business status under sec-
tion 162(a): continuity and regularity of involvement in an activity
and an intent to make a profit.45 It is submitted that simply by
restating the components of the Higgins test without outlining the
criterion to be used in this analysis, the Court created a standard
that will be difficult to administer. Moreover, this refinement of
the facts and circumstances test impacts on any endeavor seeking
to qualify as a trade or business under section 162 and without
clarification of the Groetzinger criterion, the scope of activities
qualifying as a "trade or business" may be inadvertently enlarged.
A. Profit Motive
By stating that classification as a trade or business requires an
intent to make a profit, the Groetzinger Court has imposed on
lower courts a duty to examine the motivation of a taxpayer who
pursues a particular occupation without defining the parameters of
this inquiry.46 While profitability is a proper criterion of trade or
" Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 987. Courts generally have not required a "stock trader" to
hold himself out as offering goods and services. See, e.g., Levin, 597 F.2d at 765 (factual
analysis used to determine individual was stock trader); Purvis, 530 F.2d at 1332 (factual
analysis necessary to determine if trade or business). By using the facts and circumstances
test of Higgins, courts have adhered to a definition of trade or business that emphasizes
inquiry into the means by which an individual earns his livelihood. See Groetzinger, 771
F.2d at 275.
Commentators consistently have urged the demise of the goods or services test, and the
uniform adoption of the facts and circumstances test. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 4, at 763
(fairer result likely when "artificial" goods and services test is abandoned); Note, The Trade
or Business Issue, supra note 3, at 924, 926 (facts and circumstances test is in accord with
established tax principles); Comment, Gajewski Gambles on Taxes, supra note 5, at 1168
(facts and circumstances test superior to goods and services test).
4 Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. at 987.
4' See id. Determining whether a course of conduct was undertaken with the requisite
profit motive necessarily is a subjective inquiry into the intentions, motivation and good
faith of a taxpayer. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 743. Courts have been vague in construing
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business status, 7 it is suggested that the use of section 183 of the
Code to determine the intentions of a taxpayer would clarify this
component of the Higgins test. Section 183 limits the deductibility
of expenses incurred in an "activity not engaged in for profit. '48
the nature of the "profit motive" needed to satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., Snyder v.
United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1363 (10th Cir. 1982) (good faith expectation of a profit re-
quired); Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1968) (business must be car-
ried out in good faith for purpose of making profit).
,7 See Bolling & Carper, supra note 4, at 77. It is a well-settled principle that a tax-
payer's business deductions will be disallowed if the circumstances indicate that the tax-
payer lacked an intent to make a profit in his pursuit of this activity. See id. See also
Stanton, 399 F.2d at 328-29 (taxpayer's attempts to invent storm-proof boat lacked "profit
motive" and not trade or business); Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.)
(business expenses deduction denied because taxpayer's horse breeding activities lacked
bona fide intent to make profit), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
26 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 1982). Section 183 reads in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual...
if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction attributable to such ac-
tivity shall be allowed under this chapter except as provided in this section.
(b) Deductions allowable.-In the case of an activity not engaged in for profit-
to which subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed-
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for
the taxable year without regard to whether or not such activity is en-
gaged in for profit, and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would
be allowable under this chapter for the taxable year only if such activity
were engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income
derived from such activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions
allowable by reason of paragraph (1).
26 U.S.C. § 183 (1982) (emphasis added).
Section 183 limits or disallows deductions for any activity not denominated a trade or
business under section 162 or an activity not engaged in for the production of income under
section 212. See Freed, supra note 1, at 90. Under section 162, expenses incurred in carrying
on a trade or business are fully deductible. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1982). Similarly, expenses in-
curred in the production of income pursuant to section 212 are deductible but the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 allows a deduction only to the extent that such expenses exceed two per-
cent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 26 U.S.C.A. § 212 (West Supp. 1987). To qualify
for preferred tax treatment both section 162 and section 212 require an intent to make a
profit. See Freed, supra note 1, at 92.
Under section 183(b)(1), a taxpayer's non-business related expenses such as interest,
state and local taxes and capital losses are deductible to the extent allowed in the Code. See
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2027, 2135 [hereinafter 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS]. Section 183(b)(2) allows
deductions for expenses that would qualify as deductible expenses under section 162 or sec-
tion 212 only to the extent that these expenses do not exceed the gross income derived from
the activity as reduced by the deductions allowed under section 183(b)(1). See id.
Section 183 is most often used to determine the deductibility of expenses incurred in an
activity characterized as personal or recreational, or relating to a sport or hobby. See, e.g.,
Rexroad, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) l 85,189, at 85-801 (Apr. 17, 1985) (boat racing not engaged in
for profit so deduction of expenses in excess of income denied); Golanty, 72 T.C. 411, 430,
432 (1979) (deduction of expenses in excess of income denied as taxpayer's horse breeding
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Under this provision, an "objective standard" of profitability is
used to determine the intent of an individual. A taxpayer is re-
quired only to have entered into or continued in an activity with
an "objective" of making a profit.49 A reasonable expectation of
making a profit is not required.50 In addition, a taxpayer who
was hobby), aff'd, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981).
"O See 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 48, at 2134. Legislative history
indicates that Congress explicitly intended that an objective standard be used when deter-
mining the profit motive of a taxpayer. See id. The Treasury Regulations promulgated
under section 183 reinforce the use of an objective standard:
The determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made by
reference to objective standards, taking into account all of the facts and circum-
stances of each case. Although a reasonable expectation of profit is not required,
the facts and circumstances must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the ac-
tivity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a profit. In deter-
mining whether such an objective exists, it may be sufficient that there is a small
chance of making a large profit. Thus it may be found that an investor in a wild-
cat oil well who incurs very substantial expenditures is in the venture for profit
even though the expectation of a profit might be considered unreasonable.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972).
In determining whether a taxpayer has an objective intent to make a profit, all relevant
facts and circumstances are to be taken into consideration. See id. The objective facts in
any given situation are to be given greater weight in determining profitability than the tax-
payer's own statement of intent. See id. The Treasury Regulation provides a list of factors
relevant in a section 183 analysis:
1. Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity;
2. The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors;
3. The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity;
4. Expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value;
5. The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities;
6. The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity;
7. The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned;
8. The financial status of the taxpayer; [and]
9. Elements of personal pleasure or recreation [involved in the activity].
See id. For a detailed discussion of this Treasury Regulation, see Freed, supra note 1, at 93-
94. While no one factor is dispositive, it is submitted that use of these guidelines will allow
courts to make a determination of profitability that is grounded in a factual basis and un-
hindered by the problems encountered in gauging an individual's subjective motivations.
"I See supra note 49. Because there is no requirement of a reasonable expectation of
making a profit, determining a taxpayer's intent does not center on the amount of profit
earned. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972). Under the "objective" formulation of profit, any
taxpayer engaged in a highly speculative activity (such as inventing or wildcat oil investing)
which holds only a small chance of making a large profit could qualify, even though the
expectation of making a profit may seem unreasonable. See 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, supra note 48, at 2134. Failure to derive any income from an endeavor has not pre-
cluded a finding that a taxpayer had an intent to make a profit. See, e.g., Yancy, 1984
T.C.M. (P-H) 84,431, at 84-1739 (Aug. 13, 1984) (deduction allowed under section 183
despite taxpayers "foolish" and "misguided" expectation of profit since such intent was "ac-
tual and honest").
Decisions concerning section 183 deductions generally employ an examination of the
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makes a profit, no matter how small, for three out of five years is
presumed to have an objective of profitability. 1 It is submitted
that the guidelines offered by section 183 and the Treasury regula-
tions promulgated in connection with this provision provide a
functional analysis by which a court may determine the profit mo-
tive of a taxpayer. It is further suggested that use of this criterion
will avoid examination of the subjective intent and motivation of
an individual, a determination that is often difficult and
burdensome.
B. Continuity and Regularity of Activity
Continuity and regularity in carrying on an activity has been
properly identified by the Groetzinger Court as a requisite to qual-
ification as a trade or business.5 2 While the extent of activity re-
quired under this component of the Higgins test was not elabo-
rated by the Groetzinger Court, "extensive activity over a
substantial period of time" has been utilized as the appropriate
standard.5 3 Similarly, under section 183, analysis of the profit mo-
nine factors outlined in Treasury Regulation § 1.183-2(b) to determine the profit motivation
of a taxpayer. See, e.g., Harrington, 1984 T.C.M. (P-H) 84,428, 84-1724 to -1726 (Aug. 9,
1984) (intent to make profit found in business-like manner in which business was run);
Plunkett, 1984 T.C.M. (P-H) T 84,170, at 84-606 to -607 (Apr. 3, 1984) (mud racing activities
recreational and not entered into for profit, but truck-pulling activities were engaged in for
profit as taxpayer devoted substantial time and effort to activity, activity had significant
profit potential, and taxpayer had expertise in activity).
11 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 1986). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress
utilized a less restrictive standard of profitability by generally requiring a showing of profit
in only two out of the five years a taxpayer pursues an activity. See Freed, supra note 1, at
92. Under the 1986 Act, the presumption now requires such a finding in three out of five
years. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 183(d) (West 1986). However, no inference may be drawn that an
activity is not engaged in for profit solely by the taxpayer's failure to show a profit for three
out of five years. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(11) (1972).
52 See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980, 988 (1987); Bolling & Carper, supra
note 4, at 75 (regular and active involvement is required); Boyle, supra note 4, at 759 (ex-
tensive activity necessary).
11 See, e.g., Stanton v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968) (investor's ef-
forts lacked continuity and regularity characteristic of trade or business); Hochman v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 311, 313 (1986) (casual and sporadic gambler not engaged in a
trade or business). This criterion is met if a taxpayer concretely shows that he devoted a
"substantial portion of his time" to the conduct in question or was involved in "extensive or
repeated activity." See Stanton, 399 F.2d at 329. Whether a particular court adheres to the
facts and circumstances test of Higgins or the goods or services test of Justice Frankfurter,
courts have uniformly required continuous, extensive and substantial activity on the part of
the taxpayer for the endeavor to be designated a trade or business. Compare McDowell v.
Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.) (extensive activity over substantial period of time dur-
ing which taxpayer holds himself out as selling goods or services), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 919
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tive of a taxpayer includes an evaluation of the time and effort
expended by the taxpayer engaging in such activity.54 While an ob-
jective examination of intent may result in a finding that a tax-
payer had the necessary profit motive, it is asserted that failure to
combine a profit motive with an extensive and substantial course
of conduct analysis under section 183 will result in sporadic and
isolated instances of activity being designated a trade or business.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Groetzinger has extended
the tax advantages afforded a trade or business to an unconven-
tional activity-private gambling for one's personal benefit. A fact
based inquiry of a taxpayer's course of conduct is an inherently
superior means of determining trade or business status and allows
courts equitably to base their decisions on an analysis of the cir-
cumstances of the case without the artificial constraints imposed
by the goods or services test. However, by merely reaffirming the
importance of the Higgins test, the Groetzinger decision does little
to resolve the issue of how to define the term "trade or business"
under section 162(a) of the Code. Since qualification of an individ-
ual's course of conduct as a trade or business is currently a factual
question determined by courts on an ad hoc basis, use of a stan-
dardized analysis under section 183 would help prevent casual and
sporadic instances of activity from being afforded the tax benefits
of a trade or business designation.
Mary Beth Hallissey Musco
(1961) with Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1985) (continuity, rep-
etition and extensiveness of gambling activities evaluated under Higgins test), aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 980 (1987) and Purvis v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (factual
analysis included examination of frequency, extent and regularity of taxpayer's securities
transaction).
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(3) (1972). By devoting a significant amount of time and
effort to carrying on an activity, a taxpayer indicates an intention to make a profit. See id.
For a detailed discussion of section 183, see supra note 48.
1987]
